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DRAFT/20 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Some Quick Thoughts on 25-Year Perspectives

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1. [REDACTED] thought-provoking 25-year estimate has, in fact, provoked some thoughts here. I thought, specifically, that--as a diversion from reviewing items of intelligence which are very much products of the present--I might usefully put my ponderings of the future into print.

2. I stated in a previous note to ^{Gen. Wilson} ~~you~~ that I found John's effort overly optimistic and insufficiently radical. Let me explain:

John's prognosis is "realistic" in the sense that he projects linearly. He pretty much assumes that trends and circumstances visible today--e.g., US-Soviet "confrontation" (which word, by the way, I find something of a misnomer), US-West European cooperation, etc.--will be visible more or less in the same form in the year 2,000. In those few instances where he foresees important changes, they are for the most part rather optimistic--e.g., the solving of the energy crisis, the ability of the two great powers to dampen down regional wars, etc. Finally, John does not suggest

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the appearance of anything wild or radical on the world scene, other than something which occurs as the consequence of some kind of technological breakthrough (which is, as he says, itself, quite unforeseeable).

3. But if recent history shows anything, it shows that linear projections of this character are not realistic. It is perfectly safe to say, I think, that over the next quarter of a century, there will be some rather fundamental changes and radical departures from the status quo which cannot be predicted linearly, i. e., as straight-line projections of presently perceivable circumstances.

4. To make my point clear, and perhaps convincing, pretend, if you will, that it is now ~~1950~~ 1950, and that you have been asked to peer ahead through the years to 1975. Would you in this year of war in Korea, the heyday of Stalin, etc., and projecting cautiously

25X1A9a as [REDACTED] has, have foreseen:

--The disruption of the newly established Sino-Soviet alliance, to the point of active competition and confrontation?

--Revolutions (bloody or peaceful) in Hungary and Czechoslovakia?

--US involvement in the war in Vietnam (and its consequences)?

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--US-Soviet detente and US-Chinese detente?

--MIRVed missiles on nuclear submarines?

--A manned landing on the moon?

--An Arab oil boycott?

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--The inability of the great powers to control their allies
or effectively to bring pressure to bear on Third World countries?

--The resignation, under fire, of a US President?

5. Some of the events on this list might have been predicted, but probably not many, at least within the specified period. And not many events of this radical and general character would have been predicted (a task less demanding--to all but astrologers--than the identification of specific events).

6. Which brings me to my principal point. An essay which seeks to peer 25 years into the future cannot do so with specific predictions. It should seek instead only to speculate about possible trends and then use specifics only for illustrative purposes. I would not say [REDACTED] for example, that the US-Soviet relationship is likely to remain roughly the same over the next 25 years. Rather, I would discuss trends in relations between the world's major powers and in the global balance of power, perhaps along the following lines:

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Just as the old two-power dominance of the world of the 1950's had faded by the 1970's, the present conglomeration of blocs--US, Soviet, Third World, Chinese--is likely to give way or rearrange itself over time, with major consequences for all the principal powers concerned. The US, USSR, China, Western Europe, Japan, and a grouping of some of the larger Third World states may all find themselves involved in shifting patterns of relationships with one another. They might split over one issue, rearrange themselves over another, and wander in or out of loose alliances. On economic issues--sure to grow in importance as demands on the Earth's finite resources grow--the US and USSR might find themselves in opposition to, say, Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria. On political issues, China and Japan might be arrayed against the US and USSR. And such economic and political realignments could take place even while the US and USSR maintained their military rivalry and competed for world position and power.

It is entirely possible, moreover, that by the year 2,000 certain individual events will have shaken the international system of alliances:

--NATO could dissolve in disarray; the Warsaw Pact too.

--Communist parties could gain control of several West European states; and/or non-Communist parties could run the affairs of several East European states.

--The two Germanies could reunite.

--The US could retreat into a form of isolationism; so too could the USSR.

--Internal developments in the USSR could lead to the ascendancy of a non-Communist government in Moscow.

--One or another powerful state (Japan, Brazil, Germany) could be governed by a militant, expansionist, and generally disruptive dictatorship.


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--One or another state of the Third World (Israel, Arab States, India, etc.) might go to war against a neighboring state and sooner or later resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

7. This sort of list could of course be greatly expanded and each item could be annotated to provide plausibility, if the authors so desired. Whatever, a principal theme of this sort of approach (in addition to the previously mentioned notation that radical events will happen) will be that the world environment is likely to become more complex, even as the world "shrinks," and that, accordingly, the role of intelligence will become both more arduous and more necessary.

8. I hadn't intended to go to such length or to try to write the 25-year Perspectives. But it might be wise, when revising the existing draft, to give the readers a taste of the wilder flavor I have sought to capture here.

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Chief, PRD/IC

OBJECTIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976

SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES

Provide reliable and timely intelligence, including comprehensive assessments, in support of U.S. policy formulation, negotiations and operational decisions on the following priority topics:

1. Soviet policies, intentions and capabilities for execution of political, security and economic programs, including the dynamics of and factors affecting decision making by the Soviet leadership and composition of the leadership.
2. Major developments in Soviet military RDT&E and weapon systems deployment, and Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, possible Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agreements, and the observance of cease fire/peace treaty arrangements.
3. Current and future Soviet capabilities and intentions to extend political influence and military power outside the USSR in areas of security and policy interest to the United States, with particular attention to the Middle East, to the NATO periphery of the USSR and to China.
4. Policies, intentions and capabilities of the People's Republic of China in key political, strategic military and economic areas which impact on important interests of the United States, its allies, the USSR the rest of Asia and the more influential underdeveloped countries.
5. Political and security situations or crises significantly affecting U.S. interests or requiring U.S. action (e.g., changes in the politico/military situation in the Middle East, international hostilities not involving U.S. forces, or a coup against a government closely allied with the United States).
6. Major foreign economic developments relevant to U.S. international policy decisions and negotiations, particularly those related to energy resources problems, to the international monetary system and to the dynamics of economic policy formulation

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NOTE: Some intelligence problems of major importance against which continuing attention is directed, such as strategic warning of an attack against the United States or its forces, are deliberately omitted from this listing. The objectives described are those against which it is considered new or special attention will be required during the coming fiscal year.

FY 1976

DCI RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVE NO. 1

Evaluate the performance of the Intelligence Community in meeting the substantive objectives contained in FY 1975 Key Intelligence Questions, and report the conclusions to the National Security Council Intelligence Committee for review and comment. Present Key Intelligence Questions for FY 76 to the NSCIC for approval.

OBJECTIVE NO. 2

Review the programs of the Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee and submit to the President, through the Office of Management and Budget, a National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendation. Support the President's intelligence budget before the Congress.

OBJECTIVE NO. 3

Provide leadership and guidance to the Intelligence Community, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board to include:

- Long-term Planning Guidance
- Production of National Intelligence
- National Plans for SIGINT, Imagery, and Human Source Intelligence
- Foreign Economic Intelligence Guidance
- Crisis and Warning Intelligence
- Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods

OBJECTIVE NO. 4

Stimulate research, development, and application of techniques and procedures to improve intelligence collection, processing, analysis, production and presentation, with particular attention to product improvements and cost savings.

OBJECTIVE NO. 5

Provide Community response to Congressional and Presidential Committee reviews and investigations on matters of US foreign intelligence; implement resulting recommendations.

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Suggested Revision of Substantive Objectives for FY - 1976

Substantive Objective 5

- after "Middle East" and before "international hostilities" in line four, add "and Indochina".

Political and security situations or crises significantly affecting U.S. interests or requiring U.S. action (e.g. changes in the politico/military situation in the Middle East and Indochina, international hostilities not involving U.S. forces, or a coup against a government closely allied with the United States).

Substantive Objective 6

- after "energy resource problems" and before "to the international monetary system" in line three, add "and critical raw material supplies".

Major foreign economic developments relevant to U.S. international policy decisions and negotiations, particularly those related to energy resource problems and critical raw material supplies, to the international monetary system

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Proposed Re-Draft
Objectives for the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 1976
Substantive Objectives

Provide reliable and timely intelligence, including comprehensive assessments, as an informational basis for U.S. policy formulation, negotiations, and operational decisions on the following priority topics:

1. Soviet policies, intentions, decision making processes, and capabilities for execution of political, security and economic programs, including:

a. the dynamics of and factors affecting decision making by the Soviet leadership, with particular attention to the composition of the leadership.

b. major developments in Soviet military RDT&E and weapon systems deployment.

c. Soviet knowledge of U.S. and Allied negotiating positions and force capabilities affecting the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and possible Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.

d. Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, possible Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agreements, and the observance of cease fire or peace treaty arrangements.

ATTACHMENT A

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e. Soviet extension of political influence and military power outside of the USSR in areas of security and policy interest to the United States, with particular attention to the Middle East, to the NATO periphery of the USSR and to China.

2. Policies, intentions, decision making processes, and capabilities of the People's Republic of China in key political, strategic military and economic areas which impact on important interests of the United States, its allies, the USSR, the rest of Asia and the more influential underdeveloped countries.

3. Developments in the political stability, force capability, and foreign policy inclination of nations in the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf states and those directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Options for the expansion of Soviet or other non-U.S. involvement or influence in the Middle East.

4. Political and security situations or crises significantly affecting U.S. interests or requiring U.S. action such as:

a. changes in the politico/military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean,

b. changes in the alignment or political viability of Greece and Turkey,

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- c. changes in the political leadership, domestic situation, or international relations of Portugal and Spain,
- d. international hostilities not involving U.S. forces,
- e. a coup against a government closely allied with the United States,
- f. a major change in the military situation in South East Asia.

5. Major developments in the capability, policies, or weaponry of foreign states affecting their capability to conduct theater nuclear warfare. Major developments in nuclear proliferation, or in the chemical and biological warfare capabilities of foreign states.

6. Major foreign economic developments relevant to U.S. international policy decisions and negotiations, particularly those related to energy resources problems, to the international monetary system

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